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Abstract
The implementation of Gary Beckers (1965) time allocation model is ham-
pered by the fact that values of the di¤erent time uses are usually not observed.
In practice, one often assumes that the value of time is uniform across time uses
by using market wages. This approach implies a fundamental identication prob-
lem. We demonstrate that the identication problem can be solved if production
shifters are available.
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Keywords: time use, home production, identication, production shifter.
1 Introduction
About half a century ago, Gary Becker published the classic paper A theory of the allo-
cation of timein the Economic Journal. Together with Gorman (1956) and Lancaster
(1966), this seminal work laid the foundations of the household production theory. It
had an enormous inuence on the subsequent literature (see Chiappori and Lewbel,
2014, and Heckman, 2014). The key characteristic of Beckers time allocation model
is that households combine market goods and time uses to produce nonmarket goods,
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which directly provide utility. This beautiful theory though is faced with an important
empirical issue that is related to the lack of observability of the pricesof the di¤erent
time uses. The usual approach then is to assume that the prices of female and male
time uses are uniform and equal to their respective wages. However, this approach is
faced with a fundamental identication problem.
In this short note, we present a simple approach to solve this identication issue.
The approach is based on the observability of a set of variables that are related to
the total factor productivities associated with the production of the nonmarket goods.
Interestingly, as we will discuss, there exists a close conceptual relationship between
these production shifters and the notion of stable tastes that Stigler and Becker (1977)
considered in their seminal contribution.
The rest of the note is structured as follows. We present Beckers (1965) time alloca-
tion model in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the identication problem associated
with the empirical implementation of the theoretical model. We discuss our simple
solution to obtain identication in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Beckers time allocation model
In what follows, we focus on Beckers (1965) setting in which households are assumed
to behave as single decision makers with rational preferences.1 A household is assumed
to derive utility from the consumption of nonmarket goods (basic commodities in
Beckers words). Examples of such nonmarket goods are a clean home, eating or child
rearing. These nonmarket goods are produced by means of market goods and time. Let
us denote nonmarket goods by the vector z = (z1; :::; zk)0. Market goods and time used
in the production of nonmarket good i are denoted by the vectors qi and ti respectively,
while they are associated with the price vector pi and the vector wi that captures the
values of the di¤erent time uses. In what follows, we will denote the vector of time spent
on market labor by tm while wm are the associated market wages. The former vector of
time use consists of, for example, female and male time spent on market labor, or the
time spent on various jobs. The market goods are nanced by means of earnings wm0tm
and nonlabor income y. A households preferences over nonmarket goods is represented
by a utility function u, which is strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable
and quasi-concave in its arguments z. Each nonmarket good i, with i = 1; :::; k, is
associated with a production function f i in the following way:
zi = f i(qi; ti); (1)
where f i is strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable and concave in its
arguments. Following Pollak and Wachter (1975), we further assume that there are
1At this point, this implies no loss in generality for our discussion. We will come back to this in
our concluding section, where we consider more general consumption models that explicitly include
intra-household allocation issues.
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constant returns to scale in the household technologies and that there is nonjointness
in production: a given input can only be used for the production of a sole nonmarket
good.
The households maximization problem is then equal to:
max
z;q1;:::;qk;t1;:::;tk;tm
u(z) (2)
subject to
zi = f i(qi; ti) with i = 1; :::; k; (3)
kX
i=1
pi0qi = y +wm0tm; (4)
kX
i=1
ti = T  tm; (5)
where T is a vector that gives the total time available (for females and males for
example). An important insight by Becker (1965) is that time can be converted in
market goods by using less time in the home production process and more time spent
on the labor market. As a result, the constraints (4) and (5) can be rewritten as the
single full income constraint:
kX
i=1
pi0qi +wm0
kX
i=1
ti = y +wm0T: (6)
The implication of the constant returns to scale assumption in addition to nonjointness
in production is that the cost function c, which gives the minimum outlay on inputs
needed to produce a vector of nonmarket goods z for given prices (p1; :::;pk) and wages
(w1; :::;wk) can be rewritten as:
c(p1; :::;pk;w1; :::;wk; z) =
kX
i=1
ci(pi;wi; zi) =
kX
i=1
bi(pi;wi)zi; (7)
where qi=@c
i(pi;wi;zi)
@pi
and ti=@c
i(pi;wi;zi)
@wi
equal the demand for market goods and time for
a given zi. Further, we have that @c
i(pi;wi;zi)
@zi
= bi(pi;wi). This index can be interpreted
as the full cost of one unit of the nonmarket good i, which depends on the prices of
the market goods and the time uses needed in this goods production process. Making
the appropriate substitutions, we can then rewrite the full income constraint (6) as:
kX
i=1
bi(pi;wi)zi = y +wm0T. (8)
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The combination of the households utility function u with the above full income con-
straint is now very similar to a standard consumption allocation problem that aims at
choosing the utility maximizing bundle z for given prices bi(pi;wi), with i = 1; :::; k,
and a given full income y+wm0T. As Heckman (2014) noted, this is actually an instance
of Gormans (1959) separability analysis, where the utility function u is separable in
the arguments to produce the nonmarket goods z and the production functions exhibit
nonjointness and constant returns to scale. More specically, in the rst stage, house-
holds optimally allocate budgets bi(pi;wi)zi to each nonmarket good, with i = 1; :::; k,
where the budgets depend on the price indices bi(pi;wi) and the full income. In a
second stage, the households maximize each zi subject to the prices of market goods
and time uses used in its production and the budget determined in the rst stage.
3 A fundamental identication problem
A potential problem associated with the empirical implementation of the time alloca-
tion model is that the nonmarket goods z are usually unobserved. As we will demon-
strate later, this is no real issue. A far more important problem is that the values of
the di¤erent time uses are usually not observable. A popular approach to deal with
this problem is to assume that each household members possible time uses have a
uniform price, which equals that individuals market wage. However, this approach is
faced with a fundamental identication problem, in the sense that di¤erent structural
models are observationally equivalent.
This can be demonstrated as follows. Let us rst focus on the optimal choice
of inputs to produce given amounts of nonmarket goods z. Recall that this is the
second stage of Gormans separability analysis that was described in Section 2. The
households optimal choices of the inputs in the household production technologies are
observable functions of the total budget spent on nonmarket good i, denoted by yi, the
household membersmarket wages wm and the prices pi (with i = 1; :::; k):
qi = giq(p
i;wm;yi); (9)
ti = git(p
i;wm;yi):
The observability of these functions implies that the household production functions
f i, with i = 1; :::; k, that give rise to the nonmarket goods z, can be recovered up to
a monotonically increasing transformation. This is a direct application of integrabil-
ity results in standard demand analysis. More specically, the observed Marshallian
demand functions (9) can be rewritten as (with i = 1; :::; k):
@ci(pi;wm; zi)
@pi
= giq(p
i;wm;ci(pi;wm; zi));
@ci(pi;wm;zi)
@wm
= git(p
i;wm;ci(pi;wm; zi));
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which is a system of partial di¤erential equations to be solved for the cost function ci
as a function of market prices pi and market wages wm. A necessary and su¢ cient
condition to nd a proper cost function associated with nonmarket good i is that the
observed demand equations satisfy Slutsky symmetry and negativity. As is well-known
from standard demand analysis, the household production functions, given the fact that
outputs are unobserved, are only identied up to a monotone increasing transformation.
Note that, given constant returns to scale, the possible transformations are those that
imply homothetic technologies. The chosen cardinalization is a matter of normalization
though.
Up to now, we were able to identify the household production technologies repre-
sented by a given cardinalization for z. Let us now focus on the rst stage of Gormans
separability analysis, which is associated with the choice of the utility maximizing
bundle z for given price indices bi(pi;wm), with i = 1; :::; k, and a given full income
y+wm0T. Standard demand analysis would suggest that the observable demand func-
tions
z = g(b1(p1;wm); :::;bk(pk;wm);y+wm0T);
which depend on the price indices and the full income allow us to recover the utility
function u if the Slutsky conditions are satised. However, the problem is that there is
no independent variation in these price indices given changes in prices or market wages.
That is, changes in prices or market wages will always be associated with input changes
in the production of all the nonmarket goods and simultaneously they also induce a
change in the price indices that determine the allocation of the households budget to
z. Therefore, it is generally impossible to disentangle preferences from technologies: a
continuum of utility and production functions will give rise to observationally equiv-
alent behavior (see also Chiappori and Mazzocco, 2014). As remarked by Heckman
(2014), a particularly important structural model that belongs to the above mentioned
continuum of utility and production functions is the standard labor supply model. This
model is characterized by the maximization problem:
max
q1;:::;qk;l
v(q1; :::;qk; l)
subject to
kX
i=1
pi0qi+wm0l = y +wm0T,
where v is an appropriately dened utility function and l =
Pk
i=1 t
i is a vector contain-
ing the household membersleisure (which equals the total time available minus the
time spent on market work) which is valued by their market wages wm. The obser-
vational equivalence between the standard labor supply and Beckers time allocation
model is of course a very important empirical issue.
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4 A simple solution
We now discuss a rened time allocation model that can be identied on the basis
of observable data. Assume that there exists a vector s = (s1; :::; sk)0 of observable
variables that do not contain any price or income information. Assume next that these
variables and the production functions are related as follows (with i = 1; :::; k):
zi = f i(qi; ti)si: (10)
In addition to the earlier discussed properties of homotheticity and nonjointness in
production, the production functions are thus assumed to be related to the variables
s in a very specic way. In particular, each household production technology i is
associated with a production shifter si, which a¤ects the overall productivity but not
the optimal relative choice of the inputs qi and ti to produce an amount of zi. The
variable si can thus be interpreted as some observable total factor productivity.
We note that, contrary to taste shifters, production shifters are variables that a¤ect
observable choices only through their impact on the household production technologies
and not via preferences. A potential production shifter in the household production
function of child rearing may be minus the average age of the children in the house-
hold.2 It may well be the case that two similar households, which di¤er with respect
to the average age of the children, have the same relative allocation of time and money
invested in children, while the absolute amounts di¤er given that early childhood in-
vestments are more e¢ cient than late childhood investments (see Cunha and Heckman,
2007, and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010).3 Another example of a production
shifter could be education (see Michael, 1973).
Interestingly enough, we can relate production shifters to the inuential paper on
tastes by Stigler and Becker (1977). In their paper, these authors defend the inter-
pretation that preferences are stable and that they do not di¤er in important ways
over people. Di¤erences in observed behavior then are not explained by ad-hoc taste
di¤erences, but rather through di¤erences in the household production functions that
impact the income and prices faced by households. As we will demonstrate next, pro-
duction shifters turn out to be very useful to identify Beckers (1965) time allocation
model with uniform time use values.4
2Note that, by construction, the impact of an increase of a production shifter si will have a positive
impact on the quantity of the nonmarket good zi (see equation (10)). Consequently, specic production
shifters need to be carefully dened.
3Of course, the similarity between this example and the work on early versus late childhood inter-
ventions is highly incomplete since we focus here on a static model, while the latter literature mainly
focuses on the dynamic aspects of skill formation.
4Note that the production shifter concept introduced here is strongly related to a similar concept
used by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012). These authors use production shifters to obtain
identication of a generalization of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghirs (2005) collective labor supply
model with home production. We remark that the collective approach allows us to relax the specic
way of how production shifters enter the production functions. Finally, production shifters are also
conceptually related to so-called special regressors (see Lewbel, 1998, 2000).
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Let us again focus on Gormans (1959) two-stage budgeting approach. Given our
specic assumption about how production shifters enter the production functions (see
equation (10), the households optimal choices of the inputs to produce a nonmarket
good i only depend on the market wages wm, the prices pi and yi, the total budget
spent on nonmarket good i. Consequently, once we condition on the former variables,
production shifters play no role in the input allocation. In other words, the second
stage of the two-stage budgeting process is exactly the same as the one discussed above
(see equation (9)). This allows us to identify the household production technologies
represented by a given cardinalization for z (see again equation (10)).
What remains to be proven is that we can also identify the rst stage of Gormans
separability analysis, which is associated with the choice of the utility maximizing
bundle z. Recall rst that the production functions are assumed to be homothetic in
prices and wages. Secondly, our assumption about the specic impact of the production
shifters (in equation (10)) implies that the full income constraint now equals (compare
with equation (8)):
kX
i=1
bi(pi;wi)
si
zi = y +wm0T. (11)
The demand equations associated with the nonmarket goods are therefore equal to:
z = g(
b1(p1;wm)
s1
; :::;
bk(pk;wm)
sk
;y+wm0T):
Contrary to what we had in the time allocation model without production shifters, we
can now recover the utility function u, up to a monotone increasing transformation, if
standard Slutsky conditions are satised. This happens through the variation in the
production shifters s, and thus the pricesb
1(p1;wm)
s1
; :::; b
k(pk;wm)
sk
, while holding constant
market prices p1; :::;pk and wages wm. Changes in the production shifters change the
allocation of the full income to the di¤erent nonmarket goods, while holding constant
the relative allocation of the inputs used to produce these nonmarket goods.
5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that the fundamental identication problem associated with
the practical implementation of Beckers (1965) time allocation model can be solved
by means of a series of production shifters. In this short note, we focused on Beckers
unitary approach, which assumes that households behave as single decision makers.
Importantly, however, a related identication strategy can also be used in more general
models that account for intra-household allocation issues, as demonstrated in Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2012).
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